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NOTES
lations, his attitude in regard to purchase price would be determined
by the probability of the restriction being changed in the reasonably
near future. He would not pay more because of a potential use
if it appeared that he would never be able to take advantage
of that use. Therefore, the future use should not be considered
in valuation, unless the potential purchaser could foresee a change
in the zoning laws. In such a case, future use should be considered
since the "willing buyer" might well determine his purchase price
in relation to the probability of such change.
The purchaser on the open market would be influenced by
the profits he could expect to make by reason of his buying the
land. But he would also consider the money he would have to
invest before he could realize such profits. He would not pay
a greater price for the land by reason of its adaptability if actualizing
the future use would require sufficient investment to offset the
value of the adaptability. Therefore, potential income should in-
fluence the determination of market value to the extent that it is
not offset by the investment required to adapt the property.
"Just compensation," therefore, is an award which results in
neither undue hardship nor unwarranted benefit for either party
to the condemnation proceedings. If we admit the existence of
personal or sentimental attachments to certain land which cannot
be bargained for, if we realize that land condemned for a state
highway may be valuated as farmland, the condemnation process
may seem unfair. However, the "common good" basis of the
eminent domain theory sometimes requires individual sacrifices. As
an abstract concept, "just compensation" may correctly be con-
sidered the goal, rather than the product, of our case law.
MVAIC Six YEARs LATER - A PRACTICAL APPRAISAL
The mounting toll of highway accident victims suffering death
or bodily injury has presented many problems of varying com-
plexity and scope. Among them, the difficulties in the area of pro-
viding such persons with indemnification against the wrongful
acts of uninsured and financially irresponsible motorists remain
particularly distressing and acute. The New York Legislature's
first step toward a solution to the problem was recognition of the
helpless predicament of innocent auto accident victims whose
common-law remedy proved to be a Pyrrhic victory against the
judgment-proof or uninsured motorist, and nonexistent against the
unknown hit-and-run driver. Concern for the plight of such claim-
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ants triggered the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsi-
bility Act of 1929' and the Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act
of 1956.2 These statutes afforded some relief where formerly there
was none, but large problem areas remained untreated. Dissatisfac-
tion with the inadequate protection provided by these earlier stat-
utes resulted in the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Accident In-
demnification Corporation Laws in 1958.
Effective January 1, 1959, MVAIC was created as a private,
non-profit corporation whose membership consisted of every author-
ized motor vehicle liability insurer in the state.4 Its purpose was to
close the gaps left open by the two earlier statutes, and its powers
included the handling, investigation, litigation, adjustment, settle-
ment and payment of claims against the corporation. 5
However, a study of MVAIC's short history reveals that it has
failed to attain some of the goals it was designed to reach. More-
over, several of the MVAIC provisions have themselves operated
to confuse and frustrate claimants and practitioners. The objective
of this note, therefore, will be to indicate some of the major areas
of difficulty with respect to MVAIC and to suggest approaches
useful to the solution of these problems.
General Limits of MVAIC Coverage
A clear understanding of the limits of MVAIC's coverage is
the essential starting point in reviewing the problem areas. The
maximum recovery limits are fixed at ten thousand dollars, exclusive
of interests and costs, on account of injury or death to one person
in any one accident and twenty thousand dollars to more than one
person in any one accident.6
The basic protection extends only to accidents occurring within
the State of New York. 7 It pertains only to innocent" persons who
are legally entitled to recover damages as a result of death or bodily
IN.Y. VEHicLE & TRAFFIC LAW art. 7.
.2 N.Y. VEuic i & TRAFFIC LAW art. 6.
3 N.Y. INs. LAW art. 17-A. (Hereinafter referred to as MVAIC.)
IN.Y. INs. LAW § 602.
5 N.Y. INs. LAW § 606.
6 N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(2-a).
7 Ibid.8 It has been held that if a claimant knew that the automobile was stolen
when she entered it or if she remained therein, having had a reasonable op-
portunity to alight therefrom after learning it was stolen, she is barred from
recovery because she is not an innocent victim within the meaning of that
term as used in N.Y. INs. LAW § 600(2). MVAIC v. Levy, 17 App. Div.
2d 965, 234 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1962).
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injury9 sustained in automobile accidents0 caused by the driver of
any of seven narrowly prescribed categories of vehicles. Such ve-
hicles must fall into at least one of .the following categories: 1)
uninsured, 2) unidentified, 3) registered in New York but for which
a liability insurance policy was not in effect at the time of the acci-
dent, 4) stolen, 5) operated without the permission of the owner,
6) subject to a disclaimer or denial of coverage by the insurer,
or 7) unregistered."
Once a claim has met these elementary requirements, the next
step is to classify the victim's status as a claimant, a process vital
to the proper prosecution of his remedy against MVAIC.
It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of prop-
erly categorizing the accident victim into one of the two possible
classifications applicable to eligible claimants, viz., "insured" or
"qualified person." 12 Proper classification of the claimant is vital
in determining the rights available to claimants, the coverage afford-
ed, the notice requirements to be observed, the procedural steps to
be followed, and even the applicable forum (arbitration or trial)
which might ultimately entertain the claimant's cause.
The "Insured Person"
The broadest classification and the one into which most claim-
ants fall is that of the "insured person." Since the statute does not
define this term, but merely refers to the definition of "insured" as
found in the policy,'13 one must resort to the standard New York
automobile accident indemnification endorsement itself in order to
obtain a precise and technical meaning of the word "insured."
As set forth in the endorsement the word "insured" means:
(1) the named insured and, while residents of the same household, his
spouse and the relatives of either;
9 Recovery for property damage is not provided for in the statute or in
the MVAIC endorsement.10MVAIC is not liable for intentional vehicular assaults. MVAIC v.
Jerman, 32 Misc. 2d 946, 228 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct.), reVd on other
grouds, 18 App. Div. 2d 810, 236 N.Y.S.2d 567 (2d Dep't 1963). Injury
caused by assault and battery involving the use of a vehicle could not be an
"accident." McCarthy v. MVAIC, 16 App. Div. 2d 35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909(4th Dep't 1962), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d
101 (1963).
"Supra note 6.
22 It is not possible for a claimant to be both an "insured person" and a
"qualified person." Balletti v. MVAIC, 16 App Div. 2d 814, 228 N.Y.S.2d
768 (2d Dep't 1962) ; N.Y. Ixs. LAw, §§ 601 (b), (i).
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(2) any other person while occupying
(i) an automobile owned by the named insured or, if the named insured
is an individual, such spouse and used by or with the permission
of either, or
(ii) any other automobile while being operated by the named insured
or such spouse,
except a person occupying an automobile not registered in the State
of New York, while used as a public or livery conveyance; and
(3) any person, with respect to damages he is legally entitled to recover
for care or loss of services because of bodily injury to which this
endorsement applies.
The "exclusions" are set forth as follows:
This endorsement does not apply:
(a) to bodily injury to an insured while operating an automobile in yiolation
of an order of suspension or revocation; or to care or loss of services
recoverable by an insured because of such bodily injury so sustained;
(b) to bodily injury to an insured, or care or loss of services recoverable
by an insured, with respect to which such insured, his legal representatives
or any person entitled to payment under this endorsement shall with-
out written consent of MVAIC, make any settlement with or prosecute
to judgment any action against any person or organization who may
be legally liable therefor;
(c) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's
compensation disability benefits carrier or any person or organization
qualifying as a self-insurer under any workmen's compensation or dis-
ability benefits law or any similar law.
Although an "insured person's" rights derive initially from
section 167, they are basically contractual rather than statutory.14
Thus, it is the endorsement which regulates each step of the "in-
sured person's" claim, from the imposition of notice requirements
to the prescription of arbitration as a final disposition when settle-
-ment negotiations fail. An accurate understanding of the definition
of "insured" is obviously essential to the accident victim who desires
recognition as an "insured person," but it is no less important to
the claimant seeking to avoid this designation so that he may bring
suit against MVAIC as a "qualified person."
It is well established that a claimant holding an automobile
insurance policy issued in his name is an "insured person."15  A
husband may be deemed an "insured person" because of his wife's
14 MVAIC v. Lembeck, 37 Misc. 2d 24, 235 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1962),
aff'd inem., 19 App. Div. 2d 590, 240 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1963).




policy,1 6 and likewise, the converse may be true.' A separated wife
has been deemed an "insured person," although not occupying the
same household as her husband.' A boy injured while riding his
bicycle when the occupant of a parked automobile opened the door
and struck him was deemed an "insured person" because he was a
relative residing with his parents who had insurance coverage.' 9 A
son-in-law of a named insured who resided in the same household
was deemed an "insured person. ' 20  A stepson on military duty in
Hawaii has been deemed an "insured person." 2' A passenger with-
out any insurance of his own, injured while riding in the car of
an owner whose carrier later disclaimed for untimely notice, was
deemed to be an "insured person.122
It is apparent, even from this limited selection of case law in-
terpretations, that there is a development toward liberalization of the
coverage afforded. In part this may derive from judicial tradition
which characteristically applies strict construction standards initially
and then gradually relaxes them; but inasmuch as the coverage in
the "insured" classification is basically contractual, it may be as-
sumed that the well-settled principle construing doubtful language
in insurance policies against the carrier has also played a part.
However, it is interesting to note a parallel trend in the classifica-
tion of the "qualified person," which is solely based on statute.
The "Qualified Person"
The definition of the "qualified person" and the provisions with
respect to his rights and applicable procedural steps are set forth
16 Caits v. MVAIC. 38 Misc. 2d 522, 237 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct 1962).
17-1t re Di Stefano, 235 N.Y.S2d 13 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
18 Crilley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 36 Misc. 2d 306, 232 N.Y.S,2d 354 (Sup.
Ct 1962).
'
9 As an "insured person" the claimant was precluded from bringing suit
against MVAIC, and his only remedy was arbitration despite the fact that
he could not be compelled to arbitrate because of his infancy. Graber v.
MVAIC, 38 Misc. 2d 969, 239 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct 1963).2oMVAIC's contention that the term "relative" meant relative by blood
but not by affinity was disposed of under the principle that if an insurance
policy is of doubtful construction, the doubt must be resolved in the insured's
favor. McGuinness v. MVAIC, 35 Misc. 2d 827, 231 N.Y.S.2d 795, aff'd,
18 App. Div. 2d 1100, 239 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2d Dep't 1963).21Appleton v. Merchants Mut Ins. Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 361, 228
N.Y.S2d 442 (4th Dep't 1962).22 MVAIC v. Marshall, 39 Misc. 2d 142, 240 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct.
1963); MVAIC v. Goldman, 33 Misc. 2d 703, 227 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct.
1961). The former case held that when the main policy was rendered umen-
forcible, the endorsement continued in effect to protect the passenger as an
"insured person.' But see Mayes v. Darby, 38 Misc. 2d 979, 239 N.Y.S.2d
284 (Sup. Ct 1963).
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in Article 17-A of the New York Insurance Law. A "qualified
person" is a claimant other than an "insured person" who is a
resident of New York State or of another state, territory or federal
district of the United States or province of the Dominion of Canada
or foreign country which affords recourse to New York residents
of substantially similar character to the MVAIC provisions. In ad-
dition, the claimant's legal representative is deemed a "qualified
person." The accident giving rise to the "qualified person's" claim
must have occurred in New York State. A claimant is not deemed a
"qualified person" if he is the owner of an uninsured vehicle or the
spouse of such owner when a passenger in such uninsured ve-
hicle.
23
Although the provisions regarding giving of notice of claim to
MVAIC and some of the procedural requirements are more re-
strictive with respect to "qualified persons" than "insured persons,"
the typically greater recoveries obtainable by "qualified persons"
through suit against MVAIC illustrate one preferable aspect of this
classification over that of "insured persons" whose only recourse
is arbitration.2
4
It has been held that the claimant bears the burden of proof
in establishing his status, either as a "qualified person" or as an
"insured.125 A national of the Philippines who had lived in New
York State for over eight years and was a full-time student at New
York University was held to be a resident of New York, and hence
entitled to sue MVAIC as a "qualified person" for damages result-
ing from his injury by a hit-and-run driver.2 6 The driver of a taxi-
cab covered by a financial security bond rather than by a policy
of insurance was not an "insured person" but a "qualified person"
entitled to bring suit against MVAIC. 27  A passenger could be
classified as a "qualified person" when the insurer successfully dis-
claimed coverage of the car because of the insured's failure to give
proper notice and to cooperate with the carrier. 28
Judicial construction with respect to nonresident claimants is
dependent on the reciprocal treatment which New York citizens
might expect under identical circumstances in the foreign jurisdic-
tion.2 9 An Ontario resident, injured when his host's vehicle struck
23 N.Y. INs. LAW §601(b). McNair v. MVAIC, 11 N.Y.2d 701, 180 N.E.
2d 919, 225 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1962).
24 For the various requirements of arbitration see p. 335 infra.25 White v. MVAIC, 39 Misc. 2d 678, 241 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
26Yap v. MVAIC, 39 Misc. 2d 835, 241 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
27 Simmons v. Raiola, 36 Misc. 2d 555, 233 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
2 Mayes v. Darby, supra note 22.
29 For a study of the comparative problems of reciprocal treatment see
Ward, The Uninsured Motorist, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 283, 306 (1959).
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a utility pole in New York State was denied the status of a "quali-
fied person" because the Province of Ontario would have precluded
a New York guest from recovery under the same set of operative
facts.3 0  Where an uninsured New Jersey vehicle was struck by a
hit-and-run car in New York, it was held that a passenger in the
Jersey vehicle, unrelated to the owner, could sue MVAIC as a "qual-
ified person" because a reciprocal New Jersey statute would afford
similar relief to a New York resident. However, "qualified person"
status was denied to the daughter of the owner because her claim
would have been barred by New Jersey law.3 1
Two other areas, however, disclose a notable expansion of the
judicial concept of the "qualified person." In the field of derivative
suits, a husband has been deemed a "qualified person" for the pur-
pose of asserting a cause of action against MVAIC for the loss of
his wife's services and her medical expenses.3 2  The case of McNair
v. MVAIC33 held that a pedestrian, struck by a hit-and-run driver
while crossing a Manhattan street, was a "qualified person," despite
his ownership of an uninstired vehicle at the time of the accident.
This decision established that each spouse is disqualified when a
passenger in the uninsured vehicle, but is "qualified" when a pe-
destrian.
With respect to the importance of the distinction between the
"insured person" and the "qualified person," one leading authority
on MVAIC has said:
The most common error made in the handling of MVAIC claims is the failure
to properly classify the claimant A mis-classification can result in an un-
necessary action or proceeding and, if not discovered in time, the denial of a
claim. In most cases all the information necessary for classification can be
obtained from the claimant.34
After determining a person's status as either an "insured" or
"qualified person," the next prerequisite to a successful claim against
MVAIC is that of notice.
30 White v. MVAIC, supra note 25.3 1Farina v. MVAIC, 34 Misc. 2d 34, 228 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
s2The court held that nothing in the statute limits the maintenance of a
cause of action against MVAIC solely to persons who had received bodily
injury or their representatives so as to exclude a derivative action on behalf
of a husband whose wife had been injured. Thus, one having a derivative
action is a "qualified person" within the meaning of the statute. Morisi v.
MVAIC, 19 App. Div. 2d 727, 242 N.Y.S.2d 641 (2d Dep't 1963). However,
it has been held that where a married woman had already recovered $10,000,
her husband could not bring an additional derivative action because the maxi-
mum limitation on liability had already been recovered. Mizell v. Miller, 29
Misc. 2d 1007, 214 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
93 Supra note 23.3 4 DolIard, Four Years of MVAIC, 26 QuEMNs BAR BuLL. 120 (1963).
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Notice
As a condition precedent to. the right to apply for payment
from MVAIC, timely notice of the claim must be filed with the
corporation. The nature of the notice and its timeliness depend
on whether the victim is an "insured" or a "qualified person." The
procedure to be followed by the "insured" is governed by the
standard endorsement on his policy. The "qualified person" must
comply with the provisions of the statute.
"Qualified Person"
Within ninety days of the accrual of the cause of action, a
"qualified person" must file an affidavit with MVAIC, establishing
that he is within that class of persons protected by Article 17-A of
the Insurance Law.35  In the usual case, the ninety-day period
commences as of the date of the accident.38 However, if the acci-
dent victim dies, the cause of action for wrongful death accrues
when the executor or administrator is appointed, and the period for
filing commences on that date.3 7  This requirement of filing within
ninety days has been strictly enforced by the courts. The rationale
is that article 17-A creates a new remedy unknown under common
law. Since the legislature chose to restrict this right by imposing a
time limit for seeking relief, this must be strictly construed.38 Much
weight has been given to the fact that the language of the notice
section of this article is substantially similar to that contained in
Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law, which deals with filing
notice of claim in tort actions against municipalities. This section
and its predecessors were also strictly construed. The courts have
presumed that the legislature, in enacting article 17-A, was aware
of this construction of 50-e, and consequently intended that the
Insurance Law be similarly construed.39
In order to alleviate some of the harsh effects of the ninety-
day limitation, the legislators allowed an additional thirty-day pe-
riod for late filing4" if the "qualified person"' "is an infant or is
85 N.Y. INs. LAW § 608.
86 See Kenny v. MVAIC, 223 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct 1961); Danielson
v. MVAIC, 22 Misc. 2d 943, 196 N.Y.S2d, 760 (Sup. Ct 1960).
• Sellars v. MVAIC, 20 App. Div. 2d 350, 353, 246 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940-41
(lst Dep't 1964).
38Tyler v. Gammon, 21 Misc. 2d 546, 196 N.Y.S.2d 160 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
39 Grys v. MVAIC, 14 App. Div. 2d 821, 822, 220 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 (4th
Dep't 1961). But see Lavin v. MVAIC, 23 Misc. 2d 126, 201 N.Y.S.2d 471(Sup. Ct. 1960).
40N.Y. Sss. LAws 1958, cl. 759, §608(c).
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mentally or physically incapacitated or is deceased, and by reason
of such disability or death" 4 1 is prevented from giving notice within
ninety days. In such a situation, the statute provides that the cor-
poration may accept a late filing of affidavit, accompanied by satis-
factory proof of the cause of delay. As an alternative the claimant
may file an application accompanied by the required affidavits, re-
turnable in the supreme court or county court provided that notice
is given to MVAIC at least eight days prior to the date set for the
hearing 2 The original time limit of 120 days was extended to one
year, effective September 1, 1963. The courts have construed the
provisions strictly, with the result that only the disabilities men-
tioned expressly in the statute will excuse compliance.4" Thus, in
Raphael v. MVAIC,"' where the accident occurred shortly after
article 17-A became effective, the court rejected the excuses that
the procedure was still not well known to attorneys, and that the
delay had been caused by an unsuccessful attempt to locate and
serve the owner of the other vehicle.
When the claimant is disabled within the provisions of the
statute, the delay must have been caused by that disability. Thus,
the petition of an infant for late filing was rejected when the excuse
offered was that the petitioner was under arrest.4 5 Likewise, when
an infant's excuse for late filing was his attorney's ignorance of the
statutory requirement, his application was rejected. 4
Where mental or physical incapacity is alleged as the excuse
for late filing, the claimant must "show a disability so incapacitating
as to prevent filing."'4 7 Thus, in Grys v. MVAIC,48 petitioner al-
leged that he had been hospitalized during the entire filing period,
but he submitted no statement as to the nature of the alleged dis-
ability and no supporting medical affidavits. He had retained an
attorney five days before the expiration of the ninety-day period.
The court found that there was no showing of physical incapacity
within the meaning of the statute. On the other hand, the fact that
41Ny INs. LAw § 608(c).
42 Ibi.
43 Kearns v. MVAIC, 39 Misc. 2d 944, 242 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct
1963); see Rosante v. Copenhaver, 15 App. Div. 2d 825, 225 N.Y.S.2d 664
(2d Dep't 1962).
" 27 Misc. 2d 273, 207 N.Y.S2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
45 Sullivan v. MVAIC, 18 Misc. 2d 961, 190 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1959),
aff'd mem., 11 App. Div. 2d 675, 202 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't 1960), aff'd
mem., 11 N.Y2d 705, 181 N.E.2d 217, 225 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1962).
"
8 Rodriguez v. MVAIC, 19 Misc. 2d 200, 191 N.Y.S2d 866 (Sup. Ct
1959).47Grys v. MVAIC, supra note 39.
48 14 App. Div. 2d 821, 220 N.Y.S2d 653 (4th Dep't 1961).
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an injured applicant had counsel within the ninety-day period does
not, as a'matter of law, preclude a finding that delay was due to
the disability. This was established in Holmes v. MVAIC,49 where
the petitioner, eighty-three years of age, who had been confined
to the hospital for several months after the accident, was granted
relief, even though he had the services of an attorney almost a
month before the filing time expired. The court found that the
basic cause of the delay had been the petitioner's physical and mental
disability.
Often, the failure to file within the time limitation is caused
by the fact that the claimant's attorney reasonably relied upon
information that the wrongdoer was insured. Nonetheless, strict
judicial interpretation has resulted in a denial of relief to these
claimants. Thus, in Cappiello v. MVAIC,50 the third party had
claimed he was insured, and the records of the Motor Vehicle
Bureau indicated the same. The carrier was served, but obtained
an extension to appear on a date beyond the ninety-day filing
period. After the carrier failed to appear, the claimant learned
that the policy had been cancelled eight days before the accident.
His application to permit service of notice of claim nunc pro tunc
upon MVAIC was rejected. The court stated that difficulty in
determining the existence of insurance coverage, and administrative
delay in informing claimant of a lack of coverage, were not valid
excuses for late filing. The court further indicated that there
seemed to be no remedy available for a "qualified person" in the
position of the petitioner. As to the suggestion that such persons
file with MVAIC in every case, the court stated:
[It is difficult to see how, under circumstances such as those presented here,
petitioner could have honestly made an affidavit stating, as expressly required
by subdivision (a) of section 608, that the motor vehicle in question was-
or was even believed to be-uninsured when all available information indicated
that it was insured.51
Yet the court refrained from granting relief since case law has
consistently held that the courts have no discretion to extend filing
beyond the statutory limit. It will be seen that the "insured
person" is in a more favorable position when seeking to file
after the specified time.
49 16 App. Div. 2d 1003, 229 N.Y.S.2d 335 (3d Dep't 1962).
5044 Misc. 2d 156, 253 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1964).




The time for giving notice by an "insured person" is con-
trolled by the standard endorsements contained in every New York
automobile liability insurance contract. It requires written notice
of claim to MVAIC within ninety days or "as soon as practicable." 12
Since this right of action on the policy is contractual, rather than
statutory, the rationale used to justify a strict construction of the
statutory words does not apply. 53  In construing the meaning
of "as soon as practicable," it has been held that the words are
relative and must be measured by all the circumstances.54 Infancy
as well as mental and physical incapacity could be held to excuse
late filing by an "insured," as in the case of a "qualified person."
In addition, the "insured" can be excused on other reasonable
:grounds, such as administrative delay. 55 The "insured person"
is not required to give notice until he knows that his opponent
is not insured. Therefore, if he makes a diligent effort to
ascertain that fact, his delay in filing will be excused.56  However,
if the "insured" has not been diligent in this respect, his failure
to file within ninety days will not be excused, and he will be
deemed to have breached a material condition of the policy.57
In addition to the condition of notice with which both the
"insured" and "qualified person" must comply, there is a further
52 N.Y. Auto. Acc. Indemnification Endorsement (notice cl.). In the case
of a hit-and-run claim, notice must be given to MVAIC by means of a
statement under oath within ninety days. Ibid.53 MVAIC v. Lembeck, 37 Misc. 2d 24, 26, 235 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36-37 (Sup.
Ct 1962), aff'd mem., 19 App. Div. 2d 590, 240 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't
1963).
64 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jahrling, 16 App. Div. 2d 501, 503, 229 N.Y.S.2d
707, 709 (3d Dep't 1962).
55 See Stroud v. MVAIC, 26 Misc. 2d 960, 209 N.Y.q.2d 221 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd nere., 13 App. Div. 2d 757, 217 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1st Dep't 1961); MVAIC
v. Walter, 28 Misc. 2d 899, 214 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 19611.5s MVAIC v. Brown, 15 App. Div. 2d 578, 223 N.Y.S.2d 309 (2d Dep't
1961) ; Stroud v. MVAIC, stupra note 55.
57 Sorrentino v. MVAIC, 37 Misc. 2d 550, 236 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct.
1962). In this case, the claimant's attorney received the name of the oppo-
nent's carrier from the Motor Vehicle Bureau. Before the ninety days had
run, the carrier informed the attorney that the policy had been cancelled.
The attorney then'informed the Motor Vehicle Bureau, which supplied a new
policy number with the same carrier. After the filing period had expired, it
was discovered that no such number existed. It was held that notice should
have been given to MVAIC when the carrier first informed claimant's at-
torney of the cancellation. In the case of- Marcus v. MVAIC, 29 Misc. 2d
573, 210 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Sup. Ct. 1961), the court found lack of due diligence
when the first attempt to discover whether a New Jersey driver, who had
collided with the petitioner, had insurance was made more than a year after
the accident had occurred.
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burden placed upon the claimant who sustained injuries from a
"hit-and-run" accident.
Hit-and-Run Claims
As a condition precedent to giving notice of intention to
file a claim against MVAIC, the "qualified person" basing his
claim on a hit-and-run accident must show that he notified a
police, peace or judicial officer in the vicinity within twenty-four
hours or as soon as was reasonably possible after the accident.5"
Under the standard endorsement, an "insured" is subject to a
similar condition. 59 The reasons that have been given for the
requirement are: (1) to make possible the apprehension and
identification of the culprit, and (2) to provide MVAIC with
a reasonable protection against fraud.60
The "qualified person" who is a hit-and-run victim must,
upon notice to MVAIC, apply to the supreme court for an order
permitting the action against the corporation.8 ' The application
must indicate compliance with the requirement of a timely report
to the police. 62  If there was an unexplained and unexcused
delay, permission to sue MVAIC will not be granted.63
In order to constitute a sufficient report, the claimant must
have informed the authorities of a hit-and-run accident, not
merely of an "accident." 64 Where the injured party established
that he had given this information orally to a policeman at
the scene of the accident, there was held to be a sufficient
"report," even though the officer had failed to enter the incident
on the police records. 65 Where the police record attributed the
injury to another cause, the court allowed a claimant to establish
that she had orally reported a hit-and-run accident to a member
of the police department at the scene.66  Since report to the
58N.Y. Ins. LAW §608(b).
59 MVAIC v. Comerchero, 34 Misc. 2d 52, 227 N.Y.S2d 285 (Sup. Ct
1962).66 Bonavista v. MVAIC, 21 Misc. 2d 963, 964, 198 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334
(Sup. Ct 1960).61N.Y. INs. LAW § 618(a).
62Malitz v. MVAIC, 17 App. Div. 2d 108, 232 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1st Dep't
1962).63 fDimas v. MVAIC, 18 App. Div. 2d 761, 235 N.Y.S.2d 461 (4th Dep't1962-).62 Portman v. MVAIC, 33 Misc. 2d 385, 386, 225 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562
(Sup. Ct. 1962).
65 Casanova v. MVAIC, 36 Misc. 2d 489, 232 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct.
1962).66 Katz v. MVAIC, 25 Misc. 2d 171, 212 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct 1960).
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police is a condition precedent, it would seem that a written
report should be made, so as to obviate any possibility that the
cause of action against MVAIC would be endangered by an
apparent failure to comply with this provision.
Still another burden upon the claimant arises when the insur-
ance company either disclaims liability or denies coverage.
Disclaimer
A "qualified person" may be faced with a situation in which
his opponent's insurer disclaims liability or denies coverage because
of some act or omission of the opponent. The "qualified person"
is then given ten days from receipt of such disclaimer or denial
of. coverage in which to file an affidavit with MVAIC.67  A
disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage presupposes that an
insurance policy was in force at the time of the accident.6 The
denial of coverage situation arises when the carrier claims that
the policy does not encompass the particular accident. A dis-
claimer, on the other hand, is the carrier's refusal to respond
because of some behavior on the part of the insured.69 Such
behavior would include late service of notice of the accident
upon the insurer, lack of cooperation by the insured and fraud
on the insurer.70 There are a number of cases in which the
accident victim discovered, after the statutory period had run,
that his opponent's policy had been cancelled prior to the accident. 7'
Since the receipt of this knowledge is not a disclaimer according
to the accepted interpretation, the petitioners were not qualified to
file within ten days of receipt. Since the statutory filing period
had expired, the claimants were left without relief. An insured
person in the same situation would probably be excused, as having
filed his claim "as soon as practicable."
After the claimant has determined his status and complied
with the strict notice requirements of the statute or endorsement,
18 N.Y. INs. LAW § 608(c).
GsBrucker v. MVAIC, 41 Misc. 2d 281, 282, 245 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (Sup.
Ct. 1963); Application of Johnson, 218 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290-91 (Sup. Ct 1961);
see Uline v. MVAIC, 28 Misc. 2d 1002, 1005, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Sup.
Ct 1961).69 See Brucker v. MVAIC, 41 Misc. 2d 281, 245 N.Y.S2d 640 (Sup. Ct.
1963).7oUline v. MVAIC, 28 Misc. 2d 1002, 1005, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).71 E.g., Cappiello v. MVAIC, 44 Misc. 2d 156, 253 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup.
Ct. 1964); Kearns v. MVAIC, 39 Misc. 2d 944, 242 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sfp. Ct
1963); Arculin v. MVAIC, 232 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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there are other prerequisites to a successful claim against MVAIC.
For example, in the hit-and-run situation, the claimant must first
establish the existence of actual physical contact.
Physical Contact
One absolute prerequisite in the area of hit-and-run claims
is the occurrence of physical contact between the hit-and-run
vehicle and the claimant or the vehicle he was occupying at the
time of the accident. 2 This requirement falls equally upon "qual-
ified persons" and "insured persons." 73 Rigid adherence to this
rule thus precludes recovery when an unknown vehicle cuts off
the claimant's car and causes an accident without the occurrence
of physical contact between the vehicles. An examination of the
decisions in this field reveals no exception to the absolute rule
that physical contact must have occurred, and only slight disparity
of interpretation regarding the nature of the contact required.
Where a blind woman crossing the street was knocked down
by a car which was in turn struck by a hit-and-run vehicle and
caused to strike the injured pedestrian a second time, the absence
of physical contact between the claimant and the hit-and-run car
was held fatal to her application for relief.7 4  Where a stolen
hit-and-run vehicle collided with a parked car, causing it to jump
the sidewalk and strike a pedestrian, the claimant lacked a
remedy because of the absence of direct physical contact between
the victim and the hit-and-run car.7 5  However, the latter decision
was specifically questioned in a later case which held that the
physical contact rule could be satisfied either by direct contact or
by the hit-and-run vehicle striking an intervening car and propelling
it into contact with the claimant's automobile.76  To date this
72 MVAIC v. Herrington, 39 Misc. 2d 79, 239 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sup. Ct.
1963); MVAIC v. Comerchero, supra note 59.
7 The statutory requirement for both "qualified persons" and "insured
persons" appears in N.Y. INs. LAW § 617. In addition, the same requirement
for "insured persons" is contained in the endorsement
74 Portman v. MVAIC, 33 Misc. 2d 385, 225- N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct.
1962).
75Bellavia v. MVAIC, 28 Misc. 2d 420, 211 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct.
1961). The court indicated that the language of the statute was clear and
unambiguous and that an extension by judicial construction would permit
claims to arise from accidents merely proximately caused by hit-and-run
vehicles. The court concluded that if the legislature had intended to afford
such protection, it would have been a simple matter to manifest this intent.76 Tuzzino v. MVAIC, 42 Misc. 2d 786, 249 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct.
1964). In questioning the Bellavia decision, supra note 75, the court found
the construction of "contact" too narrow and limited in that case.
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case appears to be the sole exception to the established inter-
pretation requiring direct physical contact.
Inasmuch as the physical contact rule is applicable between
the hit-and-run vehicle and the automobile which the claimant was
"occupying at the time of the accident," the proper meaning of
this phrase is to be found in the decisions construing the word
"occupying." 7 The broadest meaning attributed to this word is
illustrated by two recent cases. In MVAIC v. Shindler, 7  a pas-
senger who had emerged from a taxi was, injured when the
taxi, which the claimant could not identify, drove off with her
clothing caught in the door. It was held that the claimant was
"occupying" the taxi at the time of the accident, and thus within
the protection of the statute. In MVAIC v. Oppedisano07 a
claimant who had alighted from his car to release it from the
high snow into which it had skidded was held to have been
"occupying" his automobile at the time he was thrown down and
injured by an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle.
While the requirement of physical contact has no doubt operated
at times to deny relief to deserving claimants, it may also be
assumed that fraudulent claims have been prevented by the
imposition of this rule.
After compliance with various prerequisites, the form
the claimant's relief will take is dependent upon his previously
determined status, i.e., whether he is an "insured" or a "qualified
person."
Arbitration
The rights of an "insured person" against MVAIC are
derived, not from article 17-A, but from the endorsement on
hi's policy. Unlike the "qualified person," whose remedy in case
of a dispute with MVAIC is suit against the corporation, the
"insured" must submit to arbitration. The endorsement provides
that if a dispute arises between a claimant and MVAIC as to
the former's being "legally entitled to recover damages" from
the owner or operator of an uninsured vehicle, or as to "the
amount of payment," then the "matter or matters" on which they
disagree will be settled by arbitration. 80 Some of the earlier cases
77 "Occupying" as it applies to both "qualified persons" and "insured per-
sons" is defined in N.Y. INs. LAw § 617. In addition, the same definition for
"insured persons" is contained in the endorsement
78 41 Misc. 2d 590, 245 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
79 41 Misc. 2d 1029, 246 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct 1964).
BO N.Y. Auto. Acc. Indemnification Endorsement (arbitration cl.).
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interpreting this provision differed as to which issues are arbitrable
and which are to be determined by a court before arbitration.
The second and third departments of the appellate division had
held that the provision limits arbitration to the issue of negligence
and the resulting question of damages."' On the other hand, the
first department had held that the provision "may extend to other
questions of law and fact pertaining to the eligibility of the injured
party to recover." 82 The court of appeals resolved the con-
troversy in the case of Rosenbaum v. American Sur. Co. 3  That
case involved an "uninsured motorist" clause, which had been
used in New York automobile liability policies prior to the
MVAIC endorsement, and which contained an identical arbitration
provision. The issue presented was whether a court or the
arbitrators should decide the question of coverage. The rule that
"where the covenant to arbitrate is made subject to conditions
precedent, the existence of such conditions when disputed is an
issue for the court" 84 was applied to the facts of the case.
Therefore, the court held lack of insurance to be a condition
precedent to proceedings against MVAIC, and, as such, this
must be established before the parties go to arbitration. The
endorsement must be construed as making only two issues
arbitrable-fault and damages.
In adherence to the theory of this decision, the courts have
held the following questions to be conditions precedent to arbitration:
whether notice to MVAIC was timely under the terms of the
policy; 85 whether there was an "accident" as distinguished from
an intentional assault; 86 and whether the injured party was an
"innocent victim" within the meaning of the statute.8 7  When the
81 MVAIC v. Lucash, 16 App. Div. 2d 975, 230 N.Y.S.2d 262 (2d Dep't
1962); Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Digamus, 9 App. Div. 2d 998, 194 N.Y.S.2d
770 (3d Dep't 1959).82 Zurich Ins. Co. v. Camera, 14 App. Div. 2d 669, 219 N.Y.S.2d 748,
749 (1st Dep't 1961); accord, MVAIC v. Velez, 14 App. Div. 2d 276, 220
N.Y.S.2d 954 (1st Dep't 1961).
83 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962).
84 Id. at 314, 183 N.E.2d at 668-69, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
85 MVAIC v. Brown, 15 App. Div. 2d 578, 223 N.Y.S.2d 309 (2d Dep't
1961); Kaiser v. MVAIC, 35 Misc. 2d 636, 231 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct.
1962).
86 MVAIC v. Brinson, 18 App. Div. 2d 809, 236 N.Y.S.2d 567 (2d Dep't
1963); MVAIC v. Kilgallon, 40 Misc. 2d 822, 244 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
87 MVAIC v. Levy, 17 App. Div. 2d 965, 234 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't
1962), in which claimant, while a passenger in a stolen car, was injured
by the alleged negligent driving of the thief. Cf. Short v. MVAIC, 42 Misc.
2d 682, 248 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1964), in which an infant-claimant was
injured while a passenger in an uninsured automobile driven by her intoxi-
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claimant alleges a hit-and-run accident, it is not within the juris-
diction of the arbitrator to decide whether there was contact,8
a sufficient report to the police, 9 or a hit-and-run car involved 0
Where the ground for proceeding against MVAIC is disclaimer
by the opponent's carrier, the courts will predetermine whether
such a disclaimer was made."' When a dispute exists as to
any of these factors, the court will, upon application, grant a
stay of arbitration until the issue is determined.92
Since the claimant may proceed against MVAIC when an
insurance company either disclaims liability or denies coverage,
a problem arises as to what is a sufficient disclaimer for com-
mencement of an action against MVAIC.
What Constitutes Disclaimer
The Insurance Law provides that an "insured" may proceed
against MVAIC when his injury is caused by "an insured motor
vehicle where the insurer disclaims liability or denies coverage." 13
While this provision is not expressly stated in the standard en-
dorsements, the policy must be construed as if the condition were
included.94 Thus, an "insured," as well as a "qualified person," 95
is protected in the event that his opponent's insurer disclaims.
The problem has arisen as to whether the word "disclaimer"
is to be interpreted as "valid disclaimer." In the case of MVAIC
v. Scott,96 MVAIC urged that two claimants should procure a
judgment as to the validity of the disclaimer of their opponent's
insurers before proceeding with arbitration, or, in the alternative,
that the court appoint a referee to report on its validity so that
the court could summarily dispose of the issue. The court found
no basis for these contentions, either in the Insurance Law or
cated companion. The court distinguished this case from Levy in that the
auto here had not been stolen, and therefore stated the issue to be not whether
claimant was an "innocent victim" but whether she had been contributorily
negligent.
88 MVAIC v. Post, 18 App. Div. 2d 905, 237 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1st Dep't
1963); MVAIC v. Herrington, supra note 72.
89 MVAIC v. Reuter, 36 Misc. 2d 65, 232 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct 1962).
90 MVAIC v. Burt, 17 App. Div. 2d 751, 232 N.Y.S.2d 408 (3d Dep't
1962).91 See MVAIC v. Malone, 232 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1962); MVAIC
v. Mossman, 32 Misc. 2d 1052, 1054, 227 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
92 See cases cited notes 85-91 supra.
03 N.Y. INs. LAw § 167(2-a).96 Ibd.
95 N.Y. INS. LAW § 608(c).
9628 Misc. 2d 492, 214 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct 1961).
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in the arbitration provisions of the Civil Practice Act [now
Article 75 of the CPLR], but went on to state: "For the pur-
pose of making a claim under his own policy, it is sufficient for
the respondent to show that there has in fact been a disclaimer,
and that prima facie there is a valid basis for it." 97 Temporary
stays were then granted until hearings could be held on the prima
facie validity of the disclaimer.
Relying on Scott, the petitioner, in the case of MVAIC v.
Holley, 8 sought a stay of arbitration proceedings, alleging that
the disclaimer had no prima facie validity. The court in Holley
rejected the position espoused in Scott, stating that, in inter-
preting a right unknown under common law, the courts are not
to restrict or enlarge upon the statute when a literal application is
satisfactory. The Insurance Law does not require a showing
that a disclaimer is valid, and therefore this additional require-
ment should not be imposed by the court. Subsequent cases
are in accord with the holding of Holley that the fact, rather
than the validity (actual or prima facie), of a disclaimer is all
that must be shown by a claimant.99
It has been held that the claimant has a right to seek a
declaratory judgment against his opponent's insurance company
to determine the invalidity of the disclaimer. 100 In an action to
determine the liability of an insurer denying coverage, MVAIC
may be joined as a defendant, for its own convenience and
protection.101  If the corporation is not named as a defendant,
it has been held that it may be permitted to intervene in the
action under Section 1013 of the CPLR.
10 2
When the insurer of the claimant's opponent brings an action
for a declaratory judgment on its right to disclaim, the judgment
itself constitutes the actual disclaimer. This was the holding in
Crump v. MVAIC, 10 3 wherein the claimant made a motion to
compel arbitration. MVAIC defended on the ground that the
disclaimer had not been filed within ten days. The disclaiming
97 d. at 494, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
98 33 Misc. 2d 567, 227 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1962).99 E.g., MVAIC v. Moskowitz, 237 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
MVAIC v. Curtis, 37, Misc. 2d 97, 232 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
100 Shukry v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 835, 233 N.Y.S.2d
53 (2d Dep't 1962); De Abreu v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 32 Misc. 2d
634, 223 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
lo- See Antushkiw v. Peterson, 37 Misc. 2d 311, 312, 235 N.Y.S.2d 134,
136 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
102 United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Graham & Pardalis, 21 App. Div. 2d
657, 249 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st Dep't 1964).
10344 Misc. 2d 180, 253 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct 1964).
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insurer had previously brought an action for a declaratory judgment
on the validity of its disclaimer. MVAIC argued that the complaint
in that action had constituted a disclaimer, while the claimant
contended that the final judgment, within ten days of which
notice was filed, was the disclaimer. Referring to the CPLR,
wherein a declaratory judgment itself fixes the rights and other
legal obligations of the parties, the court concluded that "the
mere bringing of the action cannot be said to have established
that which is to be ultimately adjudicated."' 4  The ten-day period
during which to file claim against MVAIC thus commenced on
the date of the judgment which allowed the disclaimer.
MVAIC Checklist
Inasmuch as the proper prosecution of MVAIC claims de-
mands strict compliance with a number of exacting technical
requirements, the field is a prime area for potential malpractice
suits. In order to avoid this problem, and to save time and effort,
the following checklist is suggested with respect to the preparation
of an MVAIC claim.
It is essential that the attorney first classify and then verify
the claimant's status. It should be noted that even if the policy
omits the required statutory provisions, it will nonetheless be
construed to include them.10  Therefore, if the claimant is an
"insured person," the attorney should examine the client's policy
and resolve any conflict between it and section 167 in favor
of the latter. The attorney should also inquire whether the claimant
has made any material misrepresentations which might provide
grounds for rescission by the carrier.
Assuming the claimant is a nonresident and seeks recognition
as a "qualified person," the attorney should make a current check
of legislative enactments in the foreign state to ascertain if any
new law of that jurisdiction, similar to MVAIC, might render
the client eligible as a "qualified person."
If the wrongdoer's identity is known, the attorney should
immediately inquire whether or not he has insurance coverage.
In addition, he should contact both the Motor Vehicle Bureau
and the wrongdoer's carrier to make certain that he has the
correct information. If there is any suspicion of lack of coverage,
the attorney should immediately file notice of his claim with
MVAIC.
104Id. at 181, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 85. See CPLR 3001, 3017(b).
105 N.Y. INS. LAw § 167(2-a).
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If the wrongdoer is an unknown hit-and-run driver, an
immediate report of the accident, characterizing it as hit-and-run,
should be filed with the proper authority. In this type of claim,
any evidence supporting the allegation of physical contact, e.g.,
photographs or testimony of witnesses indicating contact between
the claimant or his vehicle and the hit-and-run car, is invaluable.
Of course, in all the MVAIC claims the respective deadlines
should be met. For convenience they are listed here.
Deadlines for "Insured Persons"
Within twenty-four hours or as soon as reasonably possible:
A hit-and-run accident must be reported to police, peace or
judicial officer or the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
Within ninety days:
A statement under oath in the case of a hit-and-run accident
must be filed with MVAIC.
Within ninety days or as soon as practicable:
Written notice of claim must be filed with MVAIC.
Deadlines for "Qualified Persons"
Within twenty-four hours or as soon as reasonably possible:
A hit-and-run accident must be reported to police, peace or
judicial officer or the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
Within ninety days of the accrual of the cause of action, or
Within ten days after receipt of notice of disclaimer or
denial of coverage by the carrier of the offending vehicle:
An affidavit of intention to make claim must be filed with
MVAIC.
Within one year from the beginning of the applicable period
for filing the affidavit in the case of a "qualified person" whose
infancy, mental or physical incapacity or death has prevented
filing within ninety days:
An application for leave to file late must be filed with
MVAIC.
Suggested Legislative Changes
In interpreting the MVAIC provisions, the courts of New
York have adopted a rule of strict construction since the statute
creates a remedy unknown under common law. By such con-
struction they have frequently reached results acknowledged to
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be inequitable, but nevertheless considered necessary because of
the literal meaning of the statute. Thus, any liberalization must
come from the legislature, and not from the courts.
An obvious example of the inadequacy of the statute was
seen in Uline v. MVAIC. 10  Here, the claimant was unable to
recover from his opponent's insurer because the latter had been
forced into receivership. The other party was not "uninsured"
within the terms of the statute, since the policy had been effective
at the time of the accident. The action of the insurer was not
a disclaimer since its sole reason for failing to respond was
financial inability. Moreover, the claimant could not be classified
within any of the seven categories of coverage specifically listed
in the Insurance Law.1 7 The court, drawing from the specific
listing of categories the inference that whatever was not included
was intended to be excluded, held that the claimant was not
entitled to relief under the statute. It is probable that the
legislature, in enacting the statute, never foresaw the Uline situation,
and therefore failed to include this as one of the categories of
coverage. In view of the Uline decision, however, the legislators
should be motivated to add some provision to extend coverage
to an innocent victim of a motorist insured by a carrier that has
become defunct.
Several of the cases concerning the notice provisions applicable
to a "qualified person" have reached inequitable results. It might
be argued that there is no injustice under the present notice
provisions, whereby an "insured" stands in a better position than
a "qualified person" since the latter has not paid for his coverage.
However, denial of relief appears to defeat the purpose of the
statute in those cases where a claimant, reasonably relying on the
mistaken information that his opponent is insured, fails to file
notice against MVAIC within ninety days. A possible solution
would be to change the notice provision for a "qualified person"
to conform to the clause used on the policy, i.e., "within ninety
days or as soon as practicable." This would place the applications
of those filing after ninety days within the discretion of the courts.
Then, even if the courts were to apply "as soon as practicable"
strictly, they would still be able to grant relief to claimants who
had demonstrated due diligence, but were induced into believing
that their opponents were insured.
10828 Misc. 2d 1002, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
107 N.Y. Ixs. LAW § 600(2).
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Legislative reform might also be directed toward the arbitration
provision in the MVAIC endorsement. Since this endorsement has
been interpreted as requiring arbitration for only the issues of fault
and damages, thee is often needless litigation on factual questions
before the parties can proceed with arbitration. It has been
suggested that "the New York Simplified Procedure for Court
Determination of Disputes," 108 whereby trial by jury is waived,
be adopted to deal with the problem. 0 9 As an alternative, the
endorsement provision could be rephrased so as to allow arbitration
on all issues affecting the claimant's liability, thereby reducing the
calendar congestion problem.
The holding of the courts that the fact, and not the validity,
of the disclaimer is all that must be proved has increased the
burden upon MVAIC. This problem was discussed in a recent
first department case1 which observed that there has been a
noticeable increase in disclaimers."' Under present procedures,
MVAIC may, as subrogee, institute an action against the insurer
to contest the validity of the disclaimer. However, this occurs
only after the claimant has completed arbitration. Additionally,
MVAIC may find it unprofitable to proceed against the insurer if
a small sum is involved. The disclaiming carrier will have gained
additional time as well as the benefit of additional information
revealed at the arbitration. The first department suggests leg-
islation providing "machinery for the expeditious disposition of
the question [of validity of the disclaimer] raised in advance of
arbitration." "'
Other suggestions for legislative change have been made, often
as a result of an apparently unjust decision. For example, there
is some opinion favoring abolition of the contact requirement in
hit-and-run cases, and for including coverage for victims of in-
tentional assaults as well as "accidents." However, it must be
remembered that some limitations on coverage are necessary to
protect MVAIC from fraud, notwithstanding the possibility that
some innocent persons will suffer. It is suggested that the legis-
lature concern itself, at present, with the more immediate problems
previously discussed. Having eliminated these major problems,
the legislators could then concern themselves with the minor
inadequacies in the statute.
208 CPLR 3031.
109 Dollard, The New York Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation (Part V), 152 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 9, 1964, p. 4, cols. 6-7.
110 Rivera v. MVAIC, 22 App. Div. 2d 201, 254 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1st Dep't
1964).
- Id. at 205, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
112 Ibid.
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